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1. Introduction 
The document ISO 26262 entitled ‘Road vehicles – 
Functional Safety’ [1] is a standard being issued by 
the TC22/SC3/WG16 working group of the 
International Standard Organization. Its scope is the 
functional safety of electric and electronic (E/E) 
embedded systems installed in automotive vehicles. 
Its future utilisation for real-life systems raises 
several questions:  
• The actual embedded systems are not based 
exclusively on E/E technology. They also include 
components from other technologies, such as 
mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic, etc. The EMS 
(Engine Management System) shown in figure 1 
gives an example of such a real–life system: 
  
 
Figure 1 – Multi-Point Injection EMS 
  
The functional safety of these systems needs to 
address all these technologies. The appearance 
of ISO 26262 that addresses E/E systems and 
components raises the need for ensuring the 
consistency of the safety studies between the E/E 
development and the development of other 
technologies. 
• The development of electronic systems and 
components in the automotive industry is seldom 
a top-down process based on an academic V 
cycle model. Development has to cope with 
existing elements, and in most cases with pre-
existing vehicle architecture. Moreover, the 
elements are often designed using incremental 
improvement and rely on reuse of existing blocks. 
The safety lifecycle has to be adapted and 
flexible in order to address these various 
situations. 
This contribution presents an overview of the 
different strategies that can be followed to enable 
compliance of the safety case with ISO 26262 in 
these real-life situations. 
2. Elements of other technologies 
The elements of other technologies are explicitly 
mentioned at several places of the standard. 
The part 2 of ISO 26262 describes the requirements 
on management of functional safety. These include 
the need for a safety manager, the development of a 
safety plan, and the definition of confirmation 
measures (safety review, safety audit, safety 
assessment). These requirements are intended to be 
used for the development of the E/E systems and 
elements. However, they can easily be extended to 
the elements from other technologies. 
Those elements of other technologies appear on the 
safety lifecycle of ISO 26262 as shown in figure 2: 
 
Figure 2 – Safety lifecycle of ISO26262  
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2.1. System definition 
The first step of the safety lifecycle is the definition of 
the perimeter of the system to be analyzed which 
may include elements of different technologies such 
as mechanical parts, hydraulic, energy storage, etc. 
ISO 26262 does not restrict the scope of the analysis 
to E/E elements as many system elements such as 
the sensors and the actuators are inherently a mix of 
different technologies. 
For instance, a fuel injector comprises a hydraulic 
and mechanical part, linked with the fuel hoses and 
connected to the combustion chamber or the intake 
manifold. Additionally, it comprises an E/E actuator 
that controls the volume and the timing of the fuel 
injections, which are both critical to the fuel 
consumption, the pollutants emissions and the 
engine noise. 
A restriction of the scope of the safety analyses to 
the E/E elements would be artificial and would lead 
to partial results from the customer safety point of 
view. 
2.2. Hazard analysis and risk assessment (H&R) 
The second step of the safety lifecycle is the hazard 
analysis and risk assessment that is conducted at 
the vehicle level, taking into account: 
• The portion of the mission profile for which a 
failure in the system may lead to a harm, 
determining the exposure parameter; 
• The ability of the driver or any other road 
participants to cope with the system failures and 
avoid this harm, determining the controllability 
parameter; 
• The human consequences if the controllability 
actions fail, determining the severity parameter. 
The ASIL Level is then evaluated by taking into 
account the three preceding parameters for the 
different life situations. A safety goal is then 
formulated with the corresponding ASIL, to specify 
the system behaviour necessary to ensure the 
safety. The safety goal represents the top-level 
safety requirement for the system. 
For instance, one safety goal can be "no runaway of 
the engine". 
As seen above, the H&R does not take into account 
the technologies that will be implemented in the 
system, but only the potential harm to the driver and 
the other road users. In this respect, the H&R 
classification can be derived into requirements 
allocated to parts of other technologies during the 
following steps of the safety process. 
For instance, if we consider a windshield wiper 
system, the safety analysis will consider the effects 
that the loss of the wiper function will have on the 
drivers visibility, and not the different causes that this 
loss may have. 
2.3. Functional Safety Concept 
The third step of the ISO26262 safety lifecycle is to 
define the Functional Safety Concept, This safety 
concept is a set of Functional Safety Requirements, 
derived from the Safety Goal, and allocated to the 
elements of the system architecture in order to fulfil 
the safety goal. 
The ISO26262 standard requires that the Functional 
Safety Requirements are allocated to the E/E 
elements contributing to the safety goal. It also 
requires those requirements to be allocated to 
elements from other technologies if they contribute 
to the safety goal. In this latter case, the standard 
will not provide guidance on the design methods nor 
on the safety activities required to ensure its 
contribution to functional safety. 
For instance, a runaway of the engine may be the 
consequence of an electronic hardware failure or a 
software bug in the ECU (Engine Control Unit) of the 
EMS (Engine Management System), or a 
mechanical failure that makes the Electronic Throttle 
Body wide open. ISO 26262 provides methods to 
identify and limit the consequences and/or the 
occurrence of the former failure modes including 
E/E-based safety mechanisms. It requires that safety 
requirements are allocated to the mechanical parts 
to avert breakdowns, but the nature of these 
requirements and the means to show compliance is 
left to each OEM and supplier. 
The nature of these requirements will depend on the 
field of technology. 
Examples of such requirements include: 
• Reliability requirement; 
• Specification of the environment of the part and 
verification that it can resist to these solicitations: 
moisture, temperatures, vibrations, number of 
cycles of stress in use, etc. Such environment 
specification can be used during testing to show 
that the reliability of the part is sufficient for the 
safety concept. 
• Identification of safety-related special 
characteristics, e.g. according to ISO/TS 
16949; 
• Process requirements. 
The consistency of the dependability requirements, 
for both mechanical and E/E components, is 
necessary to obtain an efficient safety concept. 
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A statistical method that can be used for this 
purpose is known as the stress/strength modelling: 
for a given reliability target, and for a given failure 
mode, the model uses two statistical distributions: 
• The statistical distribution of the stress factors 
that the part will meet during its service life, taking 
into account the variability of driver’s usage of the 
car. This is known as the "stress distribution" 
• The statistical distribution of the ability of the 
different parts that will be produced to cope with 
the stress factors, taking into account the 
production variability. This is known as the 
"strength distribution". 
The actual risk of failure of the part can be modelled 
and compared to the reliability target. 
Moreover, the ISO 26262 standard requires that the 
Functional Safety Concept is verified to fulfil the 
safety goal. Therefore, it is necessary to take into 
account all the components that will be necessary to 
show that the functional safety concept is sufficient 
to reach the safety goal, whether of mechanical, 
hydraulic or E/E technology. 
2.4. Technical Safety Concept 
The fourth step of the safety lifecycle is the 
specification of the technical safety concept and the 
system design. 
This phase is restricted to the E/E components of the 
system. It is intended to ensure and verify the 
implementation of the functional safety requirements 
in the system design. 
However, some safety mechanisms are dedicated to 
identify failure modes of mechatronic components; 
this is typically the case for the diagnostic of sensors 
or actuators. 
In most of the systems, a failure of a sensor or an 
actuator can lead to incorrect system behaviour and 
to the violation of the safety goal. In this case the 
designer has to make a choice: shall the 
sensor/actuator be designed to be as reliable as 
required, shall the system be able to detect failures 
in these components and switch to a safe state, or 
shall a redundancy be implemented in the system to 
allow fault tolerance? 
As often as not, the designer has to use a 
combination of these measures, as it is not always 
possible to ensure the reliability required to leave a 
single component as a single point of failure for a 
safety-critical system of ASILC or D. On the other 
hand some failure modes such as fatigue rupture of 
the mechanical components are uneasy to diagnose 
before the loss of the component; it has to be 
adequately dimensioned. 
For instance, in order to avoid failure of the injection 
fuel system due to overpressure, two strategies may 
be combined: 
• Make the fuel system tolerant to pressure 
loading; 
• Implement a monitoring system including a 
pressure sensor and pressure limitation strategy 
for the fuel sub-system. 
The ISO 26262 standard also requires a verification 
of the system design with regard to its ability to 
maintain the safety goal. This verification shall 
include both inductive and deductive analyses for the 
highest safety goal, e.g. FMEA and Fault Tree 
Analysis. At this stage, the designer shall have a 
proper rationale that the failure modes of the system 
are adequately covered, including sensors and 
actuators. 
2.5. Hardware and Software Development 
The fifth step of the safety lifecycle is the hardware 
and software design and verification. These activities 
are purely related to the E/E components and are 
well described in the literature on ISO 26262. 
Some important requirements of ISO 26262-5 relate 
to the compliance of the system with hardware 
failure targets. 
As a result of this phase, the supplier shall provide 
an analysis of the failure modes of its product; it has 
to be reviewed by the system designer to verify that 
the actual failure modes of the design are 
adequately covered and do not introduce additional 
hazards, for instance due to the technologies or 
design used. 
2.6. Integration and Testing 
The next steps are the integration and verification 
activities based on tests. They take place in three 
sub-phases: 
• The hardware/software integration, dedicated to 
verify that the software operates correctly on the 
intended target hardware. 
• The system-level verification, dedicated to verify 
the correct integration of the different components 
of the system, including sensors, ECUs and 
actuators. 
• The vehicle-level verification, dedicated to test 
that the safety requirements are adequate and 
correctly implemented in the vehicle environment. 
For each sub-phase, several tests families are 
performed: 
• Verification of the requirements; 
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• Verification of the coverage and performance of 
the safety mechanisms; 
• Verification of the internal and external interfaces; 
• Verification of the robustness. 
The verification of the coverage of safety 
mechanisms often relies upon fault-injection tests, 
where a particular component will be put into a fault 
state to verify that the system diagnostics are able to 
detect this fault and switch the system into a safe 
state. 
When performed at system or vehicle level, these 
tests will be carried out in particular on sensors 
and/or actuators. In these cases the failure modes 
that are injected in the components are not only the 
E/E failure modes of the sensors or actuators, but 
also the relevant mechanical failure modes. For 
instance if the designer has made the choice to have 
a diagnostic to monitor the fatigue failure in a sensor, 
the system-level tests shall include a provoked 
failure in the mechanical part of the sensor to 
evaluate the ability of the diagnostic to detect and 
control it. 
2.7. Validation 
The validation of the system is required at the end of 
part 4 of the standard. It asks for a complete 
assessment of the functional safety, based on 
vehicle tests and analyses taking into account the 
whole system and all its technologies. If other 
technologies have been taken into account during 
the development of the safety architecture, the 
rationale for their compliance shall be shown in the 
safety case during this sub-phase. 
3. Use-cases for ISO 26262 
3.1. Overview 
The previous chapter of this contribution was 
dedicated to the question “How ISO 26262 deals 
with mechatronic components (i.e. the components 
of other technologies than E/E technology)?”  
The present chapter provides another point of view 
on the ISO 26262 standard through the question: 
“How to deal with this standard in the real life of the 
automotive projects?” 
One may think that once this standard will be 
officially released (by 2011), every E/E system put 
on the market and embedded in a vehicle will have 
to fulfil the complete safety lifecycle of this standard 
shown in figure 1 and will have to comply with each 
of its requirements. 
This statement is not completely true: to date, the 
innovation in the automotive industry is mainly driven 
by the E/E systems. Nevertheless, few of them are 
completely developed from scratch. One of the 
reasons for this is that the quality objective, the cost 
and delay objectives are more easily met by (re-) 
using well-trusted parts and components than by 
designing brand new products. 
It basically means that each design decision made in 
the automotive projects needs to take into account 
those cost/delay/quality objectives while satisfying 
the constraints of the functional safety, especially 
regarding the demonstration of compliance to ISO 
26262. 
This chapter introduces different use-cases for the 
development of systems in accordance with 
ISO26262 based on the reuse of existing sub-
systems and elements.  
3.2. Reuse of systems 
Here, the reuse of a system means the use of a pre-
existing system developed under the ISO 26262 for 
a new application1. Such reuse of systems 
addresses a wide range of different cases that may 
be summarized as follows: 
• The system upgrade – It consists of the reuse of 
an existing system with the application of 
modification(s). In most of the cases, the 
modifications are motivated by the introduction of 
new features. The introduction of the “stop & 
start” function illustrates a significant upgrade 
regarding the existing EMS. Actually, it impacts 
the system behaviour, as well as the hardware 
architecture and the software design. 
• The system carry over – it corresponds to the 
reuse of an existing system without any 
modifications or only with minor modifications. 
The installation of an existing power train or 
combustion engine, including its EMS, into a new 
target vehicle gives an example of a carry over 
for an EMS. Of course, in this example, the EMS 
will have to be adapted to some of the basic 
parameters of the targeted vehicle, e.g. gross 
mass, tire size, and torque consuming 
equipments. This adaptation is usually done 
through the adjustment of a sub-set of calibration 
data, without changing the design and the 
implementation of the system itself. 
In any case of reuse of a system, a comparison 
analysis is required at vehicle level between the 
previous use of the system and the future one, in 
order to identify the intended modifications applied to 
the system itself, to its environment, and/or to its 
                                                           
1
 Proven in use systems that may not be developed under ISO 
26262 are presented in 2.5. 
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conditions of use; and to assess the impact of these 
modifications on the functional safety of the system: 
Are the safety goals the same? Are there new 
potential hazards? Etc. 
The safety lifecycle of ISO 26262 is tailored 
according to the results of this analysis, in term of 
safety activities that have to be (re)conducted and 
work products that have to be reworked. The goal is 
that any modification applied to an existing system 
for reuse purpose will comply with the ISO 26262 
standard. 
Depending on cases, the tailored lifecycle may 
encompass all or part of the activities of most of the 
phases of the full safety lifecycle of ISO 26262, 
starting with a new hazard analysis and risk 
assessment down to the phases of validation and 
production of the new system. It may also be simply 
restricted to a change of some calibration data with 
the corresponding verification and validation. 
3.3. New systems 
New systems are E/E systems developed from 
scratch that do not rely on pre-existing systems in 
most of the cases. It mainly corresponds to the 
introduction of a completely new application. It may 
also consist of pre-existing systems that are 
impacted with such significant modifications that they 
are to be considered as new systems. Examples of 
new systems in the field of power train applications 
include embedded battery loaders, range extenders 
and engine management systems for new electrical 
and hybrid vehicles. These systems are substantially 
different from the existing ones used for diesel and 
gasoline combustion engines. 
Basically, the new systems have to follow the entire 
safety lifecycle of the ISO 26262 standard from the 
definition of the system down to their validation and 
production, and then the operation in the field until 
their decommissioning. All the expected work 
products resulting from those phases that are 
described in ISO 26262 are to be produced and 
compiled in a dedicated safety case. 
Additionally, though the new systems are in principle 
developed from scratch, the use of well-trusted 
design principles is recommended in order to reduce 
the likelihood of unknown failures related to new 
designs. This encompasses standardized interfaces 
for inter-system communication, safety-architectures, 
dedicated safety mechanisms for the detection and 
control of failures. The standardised E-Gas 
monitoring concept for engine management systems 
of gasoline and diesel engine worked out  by the 
German VDA working group ‘E-Gas-Arbeitskreis’ is 
an example of well-trusted safety-architecture that 
may be used for application other than EMS for 
combustion engine, provided it fits for the purpose of 
the new application in terms of diagnosis feasibility, 
environment constraints, time constraints, 
robustness, etc.:  
 
 
Figure 2 – E-Gas monitoring concept  
3.4. Safety-related elements out-of-context 
(SEooCs) 
From a car manufacturer’s perspective, the use-
cases at system level described above may be 
sufficient to deal in general with the development of 
safety-related E/E systems. From a supplier 
standpoint, it is necessary to develop additional use-
cases, especially for the safety-related elements2 so 
called SEooCs that are developed from scratch 
according to ISO 26262 as generic products for 
automotive applications, i.e. outside of the context of 
development of a particular system.  
The concept of SEooC can be applied at any level of 
a system except at the entire system level itself, i.e. 
at a sub-system level, hardware or software level, for 
safety-related elements of any complexity. Typical 
examples of SEooC include: 
• A hardware ECU (Engine Control Unit) developed 
for a certain type of EMS applications (low-end, 
medium or high-end vehicles) with the 
corresponding basic software that includes 
hardware build-in tests; 
• An ASIC (Application Specific Integrated 
Circuit) that implements ECU monitoring 
functions and ensures the cut-off of essential 
actuators in case of severe failure; 
• A module that provides the ECU with the engine 
synchronization. Engine synchronisation is 
intended to determine the position of the pistons 
relative to the combustion cycle for any number of 
cylinders, cam and cranck target wheel profiles 
and position, and types of sensors.  
The entry point in the safety lifecycle of the ISO 
26262 for the development of such a SEooC 
corresponds usually to the specification of its 
                                                           
2
 For the purpose of this paper, an element designates a part of a 
system including components, hardware, software, hardware 
parts and software units 
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requirements at the adequate level: system, 
hardware or software, depending on the cases. 
Since, in general, the intended use of a SEooC can 
be anticipated but its actual future usages cannot be 
fully described, some assumptions need to be stated 
explicitly, especially regarding the technical safety 
concept for which the SEooC is intended to be used 
and its ASIL capability. Here, the ASIL capability of a 
SEooC designates the set of ASIL dependent 
requirements of ISO 26262 that the SEooC fulfils in 
order to cope with the systematic failures (and the 
random hardware failures when applicable). 
The point of exit of the development of a SEooC in 
the safety life cycle corresponds to the achievement 
of the verification of this SEooC and of the work 
products of ISO26262 that are created during this 
generic phase 
The use of a SEooC in a particular application 
consists in verifying that the assumptions made for 
the SEooC fit with the purpose of this application 
before its integration as every other element in the 
software, hardware or system architecture in 
accordance with ISO 26262 requirements. 
3.5. Qualification of safety-related elements 
Another use-case of interest for the suppliers and 
car manufacturers is the usage of safety-related 
elements that have not been developed according to 
the ISO 26262 standard, but that are intended to be 
integrated in the context of new systems developed 
under ISO 26262.   
This use-case relies on the qualification of such 
elements. It is basically limited to medium and low 
complexity elements such as sensors and actuators, 
hardware modules or software components.  
Examples of safety-related elements candidate for 
qualification may include: 
• Injectors developed prior to the release of ISO 
26262; 
• General purpose DC supply module for ECU and 
sensors; 
• COTS (Commercial Off The Shelf) Math library; 
• In-house software controller for ETB (Electronic 
Throttle Body).   
As a minimum, the qualification of such elements 
necessitates that their specification is available. The 
qualification is mainly based on requirement-based 
tests of these elements, i.e. the testing of their 
functional behaviour and performances, in order to 
show their suitability for their (re)use as part of the 
system being developed under the ISO 26262. 
Additionally, the qualification of the software-based 
elements has to address the behaviour of the 
software components in case of failures or 
anomalous operating conditions.  
In the same way, the qualification of hardware-based 
elements has to address characteristics such as the 
failure modes of the elements, the distribution of the 
failure rate per failure mode, the diagnostic 
capabilities. 
3.6. Proven in use systems and elements 
Basically, the scope of ISO 26262 excludes existing 
systems already in the field that have been 
developed prior to the release of this standard.  
However, new applications may be derived from 
those systems and will have to comply with ISO 
26262 in the case of safety implication. It is likely 
that all the work products required by ISO 26262 will 
not be available from the previous development. 
Consequently, a significant rework will be necessary 
to produce retrospectively these work products in 
order to fulfil this standard. 
In such a case, a proven in use argument may be 
used as an alternative to this rework in order to show 
compliance with ISO 26262, provided relevant field 
data on existing systems is available.  
More generally, a proven in use argument is an 
alternate means of compliance to the ISO 26262 
requirements that can be applied to any future 
system or element whose definition and intended 
conditions of use are identical or have a very high 
degree of commonality with a product that is already 
released and in operation. Proven in use argument 
relies on:  
• The relevance of field data during the service 
period of the candidate to a proven in use 
argument; 
• A disciplined configuration management and 
change control of the product during and after its 
service period; 
The service period of a candidate results from the 
addition of the observation period of all the 
specimens that are in the field and identical to the 
candidate.  
A limit is given by ISO 26262 for the observable 
incident rate during the service period3, as shown in 
table 1. The observable incident rate is the rate of 
the failures that are reported to the manufacturer and 
caused by the candidate with the potential to lead to 
the violation of a safety goal: 
 
ASIL Limits for observable incident rate 
D < 10-9/h 
                                                           
3
 With a single side lower confidence of 70%, using a Chi-square 
distribution  
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C < 10-8/h 
B < 10-8/h 
A < 10-7/h 
Table 1: limits for incident rate 
 
The following chart indicates the number of months 
necessary for a candidate in the field before being 
definitively declared proven in use. It depends on the 
target taken as reference (10-9/h or 10-8/h) and on the 
number of observed incidents (no or one incident). It 
depends also on the monthly production, i.e. the 
number of specimen spread in the field. Here, each 
specimen is assumed to operate 396 hours per year. 
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For example, it will take 16 months for a candidate 
introduced in the field with a production of 40 000 
parts per month to be proven in use with regard to a 
safety goal ranked ASILC in case no incident is 
observed. It will take 21 months in case one incident 
is observed. 
For a safety ranked ASILD, it will take respectively 
44 months without any incident and 61 month with 
one incident. 
In the case where the service period of the candidate 
meets this target, the corresponding sub-phases of 
the safety lifecycle for developing the candidate can 
be substituted by the proven in use argument.  
The credit of a proven in use argument may be 
anticipated to some extend provided the following 
targets shown in table 2 are achieved with no 
observed incident:  
 
ASIL Limits for observable incident rate 
D < 3*10-9/h 
C < 3*10-8/h 
B < 3*10-8/h 
A < 3*10-7/h 
Table 2: limits for incident rate (anticipated) 
 
4. Demonstration of compliance 
The previous chapters of this contribution give some 
hints on how the upcoming ISO 26262 can be used 
in the context of real-life projects, dealing with 
elements of other technologies and with pre-existing 
elements. 
For the future projects developed under ISO 26262, 
one of the challenges will be to define and maintain 
an overall strategy for showing compliance to this 
standard. This strategy should be developed at the 
very beginning of the project in a safety plan that 
takes into account those constraints and combines in 
the most efficient way the different use-cases 
presented in this contribution (e.g. credit from the 
use of other technologies, carried over or upgraded 
systems, use of SEooCs, qualified elements, or 
proven in use products). 
Another challenge for the companies applying 
ISO26262 will be to provide the projects with those 
different use-cases and organize the corresponding 
work products in a way that they can be easily 
compiled by any project in a safety case. 
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